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1. Introduction 
As the European Union [EU or “the Union”] has deepened and widened in terms of its 
competences and members, so has the complexity of harmonising Member States’ [MS] 
legislation. With new regulations and directives touching upon intricate and rapidly developing 
markets and fields of legislation, it has become clear that the more complex the area, the bigger 
the risk of differences in MSs’ transposition of the Union law. This has led to a trend of 
proliferation of agencies/expert bodies, often referred to as agencification, in the attempt to 
facilitate the process of harmonisation for the MSs. This trend has been put under much 
scrutiny. This is due to, in part, the questioning of the conferral of powers on agencies on the 
grounds of separation of powers and, in part, the fact that the power to create agencies has never 
been explicit in a Union Treaty.1 However, the Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU 
or “the Court”] has found in its case law that the power to establish agencies has been implicitly 
conferred on the legislature by the authors of the Treaties.2 This legitimised the establishment 
of agencies in the EU and the Court has since been the primary force in the development of 
agencification. Today there are Articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[TFEU] that acknowledge the existence of agencies, but what powers can be conferred and on 
what legal basis, is still a question with an ever-evolving answer. 
 
The Banking Union and the SRM 
A recent example of agencification is the Single Resolution Mechanism [SRM], the second 
pillar of the new Banking Union, created to tackle the European financial crisis.3 The Banking 
Union is perhaps the most comprehensive reform of the financial sector in the history of the EU 
and has been called a “complete overhaul” of the EU financial system,4 as it is both an executive 
and an institutional reform.5 
 
                                                
1 Chamon, Merjin, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration. 1st ed. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016: 2.  
2 See section 3.2. 
3 Baglioni, Angelo, The European Banking Union. 1st ed., London, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., Springer Nature, 2016: 81. 
4 Wojcik, Karl-Philipp, "Bail-in in the Banking Union". Common Market Law Review, 53, 2016: 93. 
5 Moloney, Niamh, "European Banking Union: Assessing its risks and resilience". Common Market Law Review, 51, 2014: 
1611. 
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The first two pillars of the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism [SSM] and the 
SRM, came into force in 20146 and 20157 after a turbulent economic decade in the EU. Their 
predecessor, the European Banking Authority [EBA] had proved insufficient to prevent the 
second, exclusively European, wave of the financial crisis.8 The EBA only had mandate to 
facilitate regulatory convergence, through drafting proposals to legislation to the Commission 
and overseeing the implementation of Union law in the MSs, acting as an aid for interpretation. 
Succeeding in what might be seen as the failure of the EBA, the Banking Union was to take 
direct action in relation to the MSs’ banks.9 This kind of engagement in national banking 
supervision is unprecedented in the Union and entails the conferral of some of the most 
extensive executive powers ever conferred on an EU agency. The SSM was created to directly 
supervise the most significant banks in the Eurozone and the SRM to ensure that failing banks 
will be resolved efficiently while minimizing the taxpayers costs. The third pillar of the Banking 
Union, which is under construction, will be the European deposit insurance scheme.10 
 
The SRM Regulation is based on Article 114 TFEU. Initially the SRM only applies to the banks 
in the Eurozone but non-Eurozone MSs can also participate through a so called “close 
cooperation”.11  
 
The mechanism, the SRM, consists of an agency, the Single Resolution Board [SRB], working 
in collaboration with the National Resolution Authorities [NRA]. The SRB will execute the 
tasks set out for the SRM. The mechanism is complemented by a fund, the Single Resolution 
Fund [SRF]12, to which the MSs pay contributions that can be used in case the primary SRB 
resolution tools prove insufficient.  
 
                                                
6 Baglioni, 2016, op. cit., 31. 
7 Baglioni, 2016, op. cit., 81. 
8 Capiello, Stefano, "The EBA and the Banking Union". European Business Organization Law Review, 16, 2015: 425. 
9 For further reading on the evolution of the supervision of the EU financial market see: Klerborg, Camilla, “Regulating the 
supervision of the European Financial Market – From EBA to SSM”, Term paper LLM course: EU Procedural Law, 
Gothenburg University, 2017. 
10 European Commission, Factsheet: Completing the Banking Union. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2015: 2. 
11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council Article 4 paragraph 1, Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 Article 7. Henceforth “SRM Regulation”.  
12 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 1. 
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The agency, the SRB, is responsible for resolution matters and will apply Directive 2014/59/EU 
[Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive], to all credit institutions and certain investment firms 
in the Eurozone and in participating MSs.13 The purpose of establishing a common resolution 
mechanism was primarily to break the vicious circle between sovereigns and their banks, to 
ensure the financial stability of the European markets while avoiding the use of taxpayers’ 
money.  
 
The institutional motivations for a single mechanism lies in ensuring the least-cost solution in 
relation to a failing bank, while its centralized nature should generate economies of scale, 
reduce capture risks and considerably lessen the risk of forbearance.14 The SRM cannot 
recapitalize banks itself, but forms part of the EU’s fiscal backstop regime together with the 
SRF.15  
 
To fulfil its objectives the SRB has been given extensive powers. This has raised the question 
whether this is in fact not a means of harmonisation, but a replacement of a national level action 
with EU level action. The criticism largely stems from the choice of legal basis for the SRB; 
Article 114 TFEU. This is, among other things, due to the fact that this legal basis does not 
explicitly cover the creation of agencies. 
 
After this short introduction to agencification and the SRB I will now go on to present the issues 
that are to be studied in this thesis. 
 
1.1. Aim 
This thesis aims at examining the establishment of and conferral of powers on the SRB in the 
context of agencification. The field of agencification is quickly developing and is therefore also 
under constant scrutiny pertaining to what powers can be transferred from the EU legislature to 
the agencies. The SRB is certainly no exception. Many authors have pointed to the use of Article 
114 TFEU as a legal basis for the SRB as problematic and some that the CJEU may not accept 
                                                
13 Kern, Alexander, “European Banking Union: A legal and institutional analysis of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism”. European Law Journal, 40, 2015: 176. 
14 Goyal, Rishi, et al., “A Banking Union for the European Union” in IMF Staff Discussion Notes, Washington D.C., 
International Monetary Fund, 2013: 16. 
15 Moloney, 2014, op. cit., 1638. 
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it.16 Bozina Beros has stated that it “reverses the subsidiarity assumption and it … centralises 
powers at the European level of governance in the banking market”.17  
 
Furthermore, when the SRM Regulation was drafted it was subject to heavy opposition, 
primarily from Germany, supported by Sweden and the Czech Republic, on the grounds that 
there was no legal basis in the treaty which allowed for such an extensive conferral of powers 
and discretion on an agency without a Treaty change.18 For this reason it is of interest to 
examine some of the problems arising from the SRM Regulation, establishing the SRB, on the 
legal basis of Article 114 TFEU.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to examine the establishment of the SRB and its two primary tasks 
in relation to its legal basis. The two primary tasks of the SRB are to draw up and adopt 
resolution plans, and to adopt resolution schemes.19 In essence the thesis aims to answer the 
questions:  
 
Is Article 114 TFEU the correct basis for: 
1. The establishment of the SRB, 
2. the SRB’s task to draw up and adopt resolution plans and 
3. the SRB’s task to adopt resolution schemes? 
 
Having defined the objective of the thesis I will go on to describe the overarching issues and 
the methods applied. 
 
                                                
16 See for instance: Tressel, Thierry, “The Single Resolution Mechanism” in From Fragmentation To Financial Integration In 
Europe, C Enoch et al. (ed), 1st ed., Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 2014: 242. Zavvos, George S. & Kaltsouni, 
Stella, “The Single Resolution Mechanism In The European Banking Union: Legal Foundation, Governance Structure and 
Financing” in Research Handbook On Crisis Management In The Banking Sector, M Haentjens & B Wessels (ed), 1st ed. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2015: 11. Moloney, 2014, op. cit., 1653. 
17 Bozina Beros, Marta, “Some reflections on the governance and accountability of the Single Resolution Board", speech at 
European University Institute, Florence, 2016. 
18 Kern, 2015, op. cit., 176-177. 
19 The terms ”resolution plan” and ”resolution scheme” will be defined in section 5.1. 
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1.2. Theory and method 
Being a study aiming to interpret the establishment and conferral of powers on an EU entity, it 
will naturally include the systemising and interpretation of EU law. The thesis will not deal 
with the question in relation to societal implications or critically examine the EU legal system 
as such. This makes the questions posed quite exclusively dogmatic, i.e. internal to the legal 
system. For this purpose it is suitable to apply legal dogmatics adapted to the EU context. 
 
In the following sections I will present the study first on a theoretical level, introducing the 
fundamental issues of this area. Secondly, on a more concrete level, I will present my method. 
 
On a higher level this thesis deals with questions of the separation of powers within a 
supranational union. As we will see, the principles governing the separation of powers in the 
EU is not an area of exact science.20 This is largely because the EU is based on multilateral 
agreements, which are much more vague and broadly formulated than any national constitution. 
This vagueness of the Treaties is also the origin of the questions posed in the study. In this 
thesis I examine what the term “measures for approximation” in Article 114 TFEU entails. 
More specifically the thesis will examine where the “executive backstop” goes for the conferral 
of powers on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. 
 
In EU-law there is a method with a certain hierarchy within the sources of law. Since the study 
takes its aim at Article 114 TFEU and the SRM Regulation, the legal basis is already defined. 
Therefore, in order of hierarchy, we need to examine the binding sources of EU law; principles 
of Union law, EU regulations, directives and case law of the CJEU. Furthermore, publications 
from inter alia the Commission and the SRB are used. Legal doctrine is used throughout as a 
complement. It should be noted that the publications and EU legal doctrine are not sources of 
law in the EU but can only be used as guidance and support when interpreting the primary 
sources.21 
 
                                                
20 See section 4.2. 
21 Hettne, Jörgen & Otken Eriksson, Ida, EU-rättslig metod - Teori och genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning. 2nd ed., Uppsala, 
Nordstedts Juridik, 2011: 40. 
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When examining the case law of the CJEU one must be aware that it differs from national case 
law. EU law is dynamic and is constantly developing in line with the objectives of the Treaties.22 
The CJEU typically applies a more teleological approach than national courts, considering itself 
not only having a right, but a duty, to weigh in political aspects in its judgements, bearing in 
mind the system as a whole and its process of harmonisation.23 Furthermore the case law of the 
CJEU possesses a status different from that of national case law. As EU legal acts are the result 
of negotiations of a large number of states, they more often than not leave room for 
interpretation. One of the most important tasks of the CJEU is to create a foundation for a 
common interpretation of the Union legislation, as the case law from the CJEU guides the 
national courts in their interpretations.24 This gives the CJEU case law a high status as a legal 
source. 
 
This study will stay close to the rulings of the CJEU in its examination, focusing less on the 
theories surrounding the different agency requirements and more on how the Court has 
practically handled the issues. As such, it may be seen as an attempt at predicting how a future 
case challenging the SRB might be handled by the Court. However, the teleological and 
political dimensions in the Courts approach, and the fact that it is the Court that has driven the 
development of agencification forward, makes it difficult to predict how it will rule in future 
cases. It is likely that the Court will continue to develop the phenomenon of agencification. 
Nevertheless, one can make cautious, qualified assessments, if one emphasises the uncertainties 
that remain. 
 
Having described the theory on a higher level I will now present my concrete method.  
 
After reading Capiello’s article “The EBA and the Banking Union”25 I became interested in the 
emergence of the Banking Union and in particular the SRB. Having read Bergström’s article 
concerning the reshaping of the delegation of powers through the Short Selling case26, I knew 
                                                
22 Hettne & Otken Eriksson, 2011, op. cit., 58. 
23 Hettne & Otken Eriksson, 2011, op. cit., 58-59 and 158. 
24 Hettne & Otken Eriksson, 2011, op. cit., 286. 
25 Cappiello, Stefano, “The EBA and the Banking Union”. European Business Organization Law Review, 16, 2015: 421-437. 
26 Bergström, Carl Fredrik, "Shaping the new system for delegation of powers to EU agencies: United Kingdom v. European 
Parliament and Council (Short selling)". Common Market Law Review, 52, 2015: 219–242. 
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that Article 114 TFEU was problematic as a legal basis for an agency. Chamon’s article27 on 
EU Agencies later introduced me to the phenomenon of agencification. This led me to find my 
aim for the thesis. 
 
Having found my aim, I started looking for ways to systemise my work. Studies of literature 
on the area of agencification led me to find a number of relevant cases from the CJEU to 
examine, as well as legal principles. Building on that, I deduced that there were recurring 
themes to which the different cases and principles could be connected. From this I established 
categories into which the requirements for agencies could be divided.28 This systematisation is 
the result of my own interpretation of how the requirements fit together thematically and best 
allow for a coherent discussion. As such, it can be put under scrutiny. One alternative way of 
examining the requirements would, for example, have been to look at the case law 
chronologically. However, I adduce that such a disposition would have complicated the 
oversight of the different requirements as well as the comparison of how the requirements were 
addressed in the different cases. It would also have hampered the analysis of the legal principles 
as they do not allow for a chronological outline in the same manner that case law does. But 
seeing as the chronology of the case law is important, in the sense that it can redefine or override  
previous case law, the cases are presented chronologically under each theme. 
 
Having determined the requirements applicable to the establishment and conferral of powers to 
the SRB, I began studying the SRB in comparison to said requirements. At the time writing this 
thesis only one resolution scheme has been adopted by the SRB, thus not allowing for an 
empirical study. The investigation therefore had to take place on a theoretical level, using its 
founding act, the SRM Regulation as well as SRB documents. The documents released by the 
SRB are not legally binding but nevertheless provide valuable insight into the agency’s way of 
working. This allowed for an evaluation of the legality of the legal basis for the agency.  
 
1.3. Delimitations 
Defining the legal limits to agencification exhaustively is near impossible, especially within the 
framework of a thesis. For that reason, my description of the limits will have to remain quite 
                                                
27 Chamon, Merjin, “EU Agencies between Meroni and Romano or the devil and the deep blue sea”. Common Market Law 
Review, 48, 2011: 1055 - 1075. 
28 See section 1.4. 
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general. It aims to provide a birds eye view of the main characteristics of agencification. There 
are of course not only legal limits to agencification but political ones as well.29 Since the study 
aims to review the legality of a conferral of powers I will not explicitly touch upon political 
limits.30 
 
One question that is, admittedly, relevant when examining measures of approximation under 
Article 114 TFEU, is that of whether a measure that only comprises the Eurozone can be seen 
as harmonising. This aspect is however, outside of the questions posed for this thesis.  
 
As the thesis only focuses on examining the legal basis for the SRM Regulation, Article 114 
TFEU, I will not explore the limits to agencification under any other articles that have been 
used to establish agencies.  
 
Furthermore, the SRB has a number of powers outside of the two examined in this thesis, which 
are also of interest to compare to the limits to agencification. However, the planning and 
adoption of resolution plans and the adoption of resolution schemes are the primary tasks of the 
SRB. It is the purpose for which the SRB was created and it is also what takes up most of its 
time. Accordingly these were most relevant to examine. 
 
1.4. Disposition 
Chapter 2 will provide a background to the fundamental aspects of this thesis. Initially an 
introduction is presented to what an EU agency is, followed by a short insight into how the SRB 
compares to other EU agencies. Lastly is an examination of the term agencification, what it 
entails and what issues come with it.  
 
Chapter 3 concerns the legal basis for the SRM Regulation – Article 114 TFEU, its purpose and 
its use as a legal basis for agencies.  
 
                                                
29 Craig, Paul, “Institutions, power, and institutional balance” in The Evolution Of EU Law. P Craig & G De Búrca (ed), 2nd 
ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2011: 67. 
30 For a more thorough review see for instance: Chamon, Merjin, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation 
of the EU Administration. 1st ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
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In chapter 4 an account is made of the requirements for an agency relevant to the establishment 
and powers mentioned previously, examining their origin and significance. The chapter aims at 
systemising and interpreting the different requirements in relation to agencies based on Article 
114 TFEU. Even though there is much written on the subject there seems to be no consensus 
on the issue. The requirements stem from different sources and the case law has developed and 
changed through decades. It is thus difficult to draw clear lines between the different 
requirements. For the sake of clarity I have divided them into five main themes.  
 
The first theme concerns the supranational level of the legislation. For an agency to be rightly 
based on an EU level and on Article 114 TFEU it must respect the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality as well as have a harmonising objective. 
 
The second theme concerns the agency’s place in the institutional framework. The agency 
powers must be within the limits of conferred powers on the Union and it must not affect the 
Union balance of powers nor its institutional balance. There are different views on whether 
institutional balance is an EU principle and if so, whether it is a legal or a political principle. 
For the purpose of this thesis Chamon’s definition of the term will be applied.31  
 
The third theme addresses the nature of the powers conferred. An agency can only be given 
executive powers, excluding the possibility of exercising discretion. 
 
The fourth theme considers the impact of the acts adopted by the agency. A differentiation is 
made between acts having the force of law or being of general application.  
 
The fifth theme concerns review of the agency. The Commission must have insight into the 
work of the agency and there must be mechanisms for accountability in place.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the issues that this thesis aims at examining, by looking at the agency’s 
structure, tasks, procedures, etc. in comparison to the limits to agencification determined in the 
previous chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes.  
                                                
31 See section 4.2. of this thesis and Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 154.  
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2. Background 
2.1. What is an agency? 
The term EU Agency is difficult to determine and because of this there is dissonance in the 
estimation of the number of EU agencies.32 This is further complicated by the naming of the 
agencies, where the official titles include terms as “authority”, “institute” and “mechanism”. 
The official EU Agencies brochure define the term “EU agencies” as entailing EU decentralised 
agencies and Joint Undertakings and state that there are 44 EU agencies as of 2017.33 This 
would mean that the number of agencies has increased at least four times since the year 2000, 
having led to some authors describing it as a “mushrooming of agencies”34. 
 
Agencies have become a prominent feature in the EU institutional landscape. They allow for 
the legislature to focus on policy formation while facilitating the use of experts, increasing the 
credibility of the decisions thus made.35 According to Scholten and Van Rijsbergen, the scope 
of the delegation of powers has not only grown quantitatively, but also qualitatively, implying 
that the powers of the agencies has grown as well.36  
 
The powers of agencies vary greatly with regards to their purposes. They are specialized bodies 
outside the key Union institutions while being independent legal entities with tasks ranging 
from information gathering to decision making and supervision.37 They cover vast areas ranging 
from plant variety to aviation safety and disease prevention.38 
 
Most agencies share the same organisational structure. There is a management board led by a 
director and officials are usually employed in a temporary or quasi-temporary position. The 
management board typically decides on administrative matters such as the agency’s budget, 
work programme, etc. Most management boards are composed of a large number of MS 
                                                
32 Scholten, Miroslava & van Rijsbergen, Marloes, “The Limits of Agencification in the European Union”. German Law 
Journal, 15, 2014: 1227. 
33 European Union, The EU Agencies - Working for you. Luxemburg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016, 4.  
34 Chamon, 2011, op. cit., 1055. 
35 Craig, 2011, op. cit., 66-67. 
36 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1224. 
37 Scholten, Miroslava. The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent Regulatory Agencies. 1st ed., Leiden, Brill, 
2014: 47. 
38 European Union, The EU Agencies - Working for you. Luxemburg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. 
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representatives. The Commission usually has one or two representatives as well as the European 
Parliament in certain cases.39  
 
Having looked at the characteristics of agencies in general we shall go on to inspect the SRB. 
 
2.2. The SRB specifically 
The SRB is a specific agency. The SRM Regulation preamble states that in order to ensure a 
swift and effective resolution procedure, the Board shall be a specific Union agency with a 
specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks [sic!], and which departs from the model 
of all other Union agencies.40, 41 
 
The Board of the SRB is composed of a Chair and four full-time members.42 The Chair is 
supported by a Vice Chair without the right to vote. Each participating MS shall also appoint a 
member of the Board, representing their NRA, to participate in the plenary sessions. The 
Commission and the ECB both have permanent observers participating in the plenary and 
executive sessions but have no vote.43 Other observers can be invited on an ad hoc basis. 
Depending on the task to be performed the Board convenes in different compositions.  
 
The plenary session 
For the plenary sessions all the members of the Board participate, as well as the Vice-Chair (as 
a non-voting member) and the permanent observers.44 This means that all the MS 
representatives are present. In its plenary sessions the Board inter alia adopts its work 
programme for the following year and adopts and monitors its budget. In addition, it evaluates 
the use of resolution tools when the use of the Fund has reached a certain threshold and in 
exceptional cases it decides on the use of the Fund.45  
                                                
39 Egeberg, Morten & Trondal, Jarle, "Agencification of the European Union administration - Connecting the dots". TARN 
Working Paper Series, 1, 2016: 3.  
40 Emphasis added.  
41 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 31. 
42 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 43 and 56. 
43 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 43 paragraph 3. 
44 Decision of the plenary session of the board of 29 April 2015 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Single Resolution Board 
in its Plenary Session, SRB/PS/2015/9, 29.4.2015, Article 3. 
45 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 50. 
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The executive session 
The executive session takes two forms. In the “restricted” executive sessions only the Chair, 
Vice-Chair (as a non-voting member), the four full-time members and the permanent observers 
participate.46 If the session will deliberate on a specific bank it does so in an “extended” 
executive session, where the appointed representative of the relevant national or group-level 
resolution authority also participates.47 In its executive session the Board inter alia prepares the 
decisions to be adopted by the Board in its plenary session as well as prepare, assess and 
approve resolution plans. It also applies simplified obligations and determine the minimum 
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities to be met at all times for certain entities. 
Most importantly it provides the Commission with a resolution scheme if an entity is failing or 
likely to fail.48  
 
2.3. The reasons for agencification, and the issues succeeding 
After this insight into agencies and the SRB we shall move to the subject of agencification. 
Scholten and Van Rijsbergen claim that agencification can be divided into two characterizing 
trends: firstly, a growing scope of delegation of public authority to the executive branch and 
secondly “cutting the executive into smaller pieces” or in other words a transfer of the executive 
branch within and beyond the national border.49 One of the reasons for this transfer of powers 
is the wish to solve the issue of “Community administrative deficit” by creating mechanisms 
that are politically acceptable for the MSs as well as the supranational institution without 
directly strengthening the Commission.50 Cutting the executive into smaller pieces also allows 
for a geographical diffusion of it, facing the growing criticism to the centralisation of powers 
in Brussels, by placing agencies in different MSs.51  
 
                                                
46 Decision of the plenary session of the board of 29 April 2015 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Single Resolution Board 
in its Executive Session, SRB/PS/2015/8, 29.4.2015, Article 3. 
47 The Single Resolution Board, The Single Resolution Mechanism - Introduction to resolution planning. Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2016: p 10. 
48 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 54 paragraph 2. 
49 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1223-1224. 
50 Chiti, Edoardo, “An important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: features, problems and perspectives of European 
agencies”. Common Market Law Review, 46, 2009: 1398. 
51 Schneider, Jens-Peter, "A Common Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni Doctrine". Administrative 
Law Review, 61, 2009: 32. 
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One source for criticism against agencification stems from Montesquieu’s theory of separation 
of powers. The theory implies that the political, the legislative and the executive powers must 
be separated. The executive power should be completely detached from the legislative, 
exclusively executing the tasks it is given by the legislative power, allowed the freedom that 
the law provides but never being able to exceed it or put it out of play.52 A risk when conferring 
decision making powers on an agency, is the disruption of the separation of powers.  
 
A couple of other issues often referred to when examining agencification are democratic 
legitimacy and accountability.53 The question of democratic legitimacy stems from the issue of 
most agencies not being treaty-based.54 The fact that these powerful agencies have been created 
without a constitutional change may lead to a lessened social acceptance as the boards of 
agencies are not democratically elected but still draft regulation for vast areas of the Union. 
This is especially true for the Banking Union Agencies, as they have, inter alia, been given the 
power to issue legally binding acts and to surpass relevant national authorities in certain cases.  
 
As regards accountability this mostly concerns the independent regulatory agencies due to the 
labelling “independent”, as it is often interpreted as meaning “unaccountable”.55 The term 
independence is rather to be interpreted as its independence from political and industrial 
interests.56 The Commission describes the real “raison d´être” of the regulatory agencies to be 
the ability to meet specific needs on a case-by-case basis and the independence of their technical 
and/or scientific assessments.57 
 
One of the main issues with accountability is the very diverse ways in which the Council and 
the Parliament can get involved in the actions of the agencies.58 This sort of diversity may cause 
                                                
52 Liedman, Sven-Eric, Från Platon till kriget mot terrorismen. 14th ed., Falun, Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2008: 132. 
53 See for instance: Szegedi, Laszlo, “EU-level Market Surveillance and Regulation by EU Agencies in Light of the Reshaped 
Meroni Doctrine”. European Networks Law and Regulation Quarterly, 2, 2014: 300, and Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, 
op. cit., 1224. 
54 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit.,1225. 
55 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1224. 
56 See further on the EU separation of powers in section 4.2. 
57 European Commission, Draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies. 
Brussels, 2005: 2 and 5. 
58 See generally: Bovens, Mark, “Analysing and assessing accountability: a conceptual framework”. European Law Journal, 
13, 2007, 447–468. 
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accountability deficits, as it scatters the accountability fora that are supposed to hold the 
agencies responsible.59 
 
As we have now seen, there are several issues concerning the agencification of the EU, most of 
them having to do with the lack of a relevant legal basis to establish an agency on. Accordingly, 
we shall now take a closer look on the Article that was used to establish the SRB, Article 114 
TFEU. 
  
                                                
59 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1235. 
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3. Article 114 TFEU measures for approximation 
3.1. The purpose of Article 114 TFEU 
“Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council 
shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation60 of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” 
 – Article 114(1) TFEU 
The EU internal market constitutes an area that is to be free from obstacles to the movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital.61 In order to achieve this, the TFEU allows for direct 
regulatory action.62 Article 114 TFEU establishes the possibility for the European Parliament 
and the Council to adopt measures for the approximation of laws in the MSs that have as their 
goal the establishment and functioning of the internal market.  
 
The use of Article 114 TFEU as a basis for a measure is directly tied to the improvement of the 
internal market. In the case Tobacco Advertising I, the Court found that a measure adopted on 
the basis of Article 114 TFEU must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. The existence of 
disparities between the MSs that may form an abstract risk of obstructing the internal market is 
not sufficient.63 The case concerned a directive that was stated to have been adopted with the 
aim to promote the establishment of the internal market, but was annulled on the suspicion that 
it was in fact intended to harmonise an area outside of the Union’s competence, namely public 
health.64  
                                                
60 Emphasis added. 
61 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Article 26 paragraph 2.  
62 Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter, “Meroni Circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies”. Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 21, 2014: 66. 
63 Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (EU:C:2000:544) 
paragraph 84. 
64 Maletic, Isidora, “Theory and practice of harmonisation in the European internal market” in Theory And Practice Of 
Harmonisation. M Andenas & C Baasch Andersen (ed), 1st ed., Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011, pp. 315. 
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The question of what entails a “measure” has long been thought to be limited to rules directly 
approximating national rules through the replacement of national diverging alternatives, but the 
Court has increasingly opened up for it including also institutional arrangements.65  
 
3.2. Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for an agency 
The following section will give an introduction to the development of the case law that led 
Article 114 TFEU to be accepted as a legal basis for an agency. This description will remain 
very short as the subject is further discussed in section 4.1. 
 
One of the most important limitations to the use of Article 114 TFEU is that its application must 
be centred around the harmonisation of national laws.66 It has been questioned whether this 
includes the possibility that it could act as a sole legal basis for the establishment of an EU 
Agency. Moloney notes that the SRM amounts to a significant extension of the traditional 
understanding of the term “harmonisation” and that this generates a risk of constitutional 
instability.67 
 
In the case Smoke Flavourings68 the United Kingdom [UK] brought an action for annulment to 
the CJEU, arguing that Article 114 TFEU could not be seen as an appropriate legal basis for 
Regulation (EU) No 2065/2003 establishing a Union list of authorised smoke flavouring 
products for use in foods. The Court found that in areas where MSs have taken or are about to 
take divergent measures that may have an inhibitive impact on the internal market, Article 114 
TFEU allows the legislature to intervene by adopting suitable measures. It further established 
that the authors of the Treaty had intended to confer upon the legislature a wide margin of 
discretion as regards what is the most appropriate technique for achieving the desired result, 
especially concerning areas that are characterized by complex technical features.69 The Court 
                                                
65 Van Cleynenbreugel, 2014, op. cit., 68. 
66 de Búrca, Gráinne & de Witte, Bruno, “The Delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States” in Accountability 
And Legitimacy In The European Union. A Arnull & D Wincott (ed), 1st ed., New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2002: 
215. 
67 Moloney, 2014, op. cit., 1654. 
68 Case C-66/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union (EU:C:2005:743). 
69 Case C-66/04 Smoke Flavourings, op. cit., paragraph 45. 
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also pointed out that it is especially necessary that the legislature is given a wide margin of 
discretion when it comes to the protection of a public interest, in this case ensuring a high level 
of protection of health.70  
 
In 2011 the three European Supervisory Authorities [ESA] were created; the EBA, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA] and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority. The ESMA’s legal basis was challenged by the UK in the 
CJEU, which found Article 114 TFEU to be a valid legal basis for it.71 As of today there are 
several agencies based on Article 114 TFEU, not least in the financial sector.  
  
                                                
70 Case C-66/04 Smoke Flavourings, op. cit., paragraph 46. 
71 See further Chapter 4.  
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4. Legal limits to agencification 
Having been introduced to the phenomenon of agencification, the SRB and its legal basis, we 
shall now continue to look at the legal limits to agencification and the requirements to be 
fulfilled by an agency for it to be rightly established on Article 114. As previously stated, this 
will be done under five themes.  
 
4.1. Level of legislation: Subsidiarity, proportionality and harmonising 
objective 
The first theme to be discussed is the level of legislation. For an agency to be rightly established 
on an EU level and on Article 114 TFEU it must respect the limits of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and have a truly harmonising objective. 
 
Subsidiarity and proportionality 
The use of Union competences is ruled by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
stated in Article 5 Treaty on European Union [TEU]. The principle of subsidiarity states that 
the EU shall only act in areas which are not covered by its exclusive competence if the 
objectives of the measure cannot be sufficiently achieved on a MS level by the simultaneous 
enactment of identical legislation. This means that measures should be taken at the lowest level 
appropriate.72 For the purpose of agencification this means that the EU is only allowed to act if 
it is clear that the area in which an agency is to act comprises issues that are not sufficiently 
addressed on a MS level. However, the CJEU has handled this more as a political than legal 
principle, avoiding making the actual material examination of whether the action can be 
sufficiently achieved on a MS level. It has instead chosen to look at it from a procedural 
perspective, namely through examining whether the legislature has actually considered the 
implications for the principle of subsidiarity of the measure. It has however not scrutinized the 
reasons given by the legislature.73  
 
In the case Working Time the Court found that if there was a question of harmonisation then 
this “necessarily” presupposed Union-wide action. It did not, however, assess the question of 
                                                
72 Barnard, Catherine, The Substantive Law of the EU. 5th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016: 649. 
73 Barnard, 2016, op. cit., 649-650.  
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whether harmonisation was indeed necessary in the area in question.74 In the case Ex p. BAT 
the Court developed this principle stating that the purpose of the directive in question was the 
elimination of barriers emanating from differences in MS laws.75 Such an objective could not, 
the Court stated, be sufficiently achieved by MSs individually and is hence better achieved on 
a Union level.76  
 
If, after applying the principle of subsidiarity, it becomes clear that the Union should act, the 
measure adopted must also be proportionate.77 The principle of proportionality states that Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary in order to achieve the Treaty objectives.78 The Court 
has been quite reluctant to engage in the questions of proportionality. In reference to the 
principle of proportionality it stated in the case Ex p. BAT that:  
…the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that 
involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, 
and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of 
a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue.79 
This means that there is a high, if not very high, threshold for the considering a measure to be 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued. 
 
Harmonising objective 
The purpose of Article 114 TFEU is to allow the legislature to take measures that are aimed at 
harmonising the internal market.80 This means that the measure must have as its true objective 
                                                
74 Barnard, 2016, op.cit., 650 and Case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the 
European Union (EU:C:1996:431) paragraph 47. 
75 Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd. (EU:C:2002:741) paragraph 181. 
76 Case C-491/01 Ex p. BAT, op. cit., paragraph 182-183. 
77 Barnard, 2016, op. cit., 649. 
78 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union Article 5. 
79 Case C-491/01 Ex p. BAT, op. cit., paragraph 123. 
80 de Búrca & de Witte, 2002, op. cit., 215. 
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the harmonisation of a certain area of legislation. Several cases have touched upon the subject 
of what can compose a harmonising measure. One of them is the Smoke Flavourings case.  
 
In the case Smoke Flavourings the Court found, in regard to harmonisation under Article 114 
TFEU, that the expression “measures for the approximation” intended to provide the legislature 
with a wide margin of discretion. Thus allowing it to decide what is the most appropriate 
measure for approximation on a case-by-case basis and to adapt the measure after the field in 
need of harmonisation and its specific features. This, the Court found, was especially true for 
fields characterized by complex technical features.81  
 
After the legislature had commenced to establish agencies on the basis of Article 114 TFEU it 
was largely questioned if the establishment of an agency really could constitute a measure for 
approximation.  
 
The European Network and Information Security Agency [ENISA] was established to 
contribute to the improvement of network and information security in the EU and became 
operational in 2005. Soon after the adoption of the ENISA Regulation82, establishing the 
ENISA, the UK questioned the use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the Regulation. 
The UK argued that the purpose of Article 114 TFEU was the approximation of laws and that 
the Regulation in fact took effect on the institutional level.83  
 
The UK requested that the Court examine whether the instrument adopted could have been 
carried out by the simultaneous enactment of identical legislation in each MS.84 The UK also 
submitted that none of the provisions in the ENISA Regulation, even indirectly or in a minor 
way, approximates national legislation. Further they stated that simply because a measure may 
benefit the functioning of the internal market does not mean that it thereby constitutes 
harmonisation within the meaning of Article 114 TFEU.85  
 
                                                
81 Case C-66/04 Smoke Flavourings, op. cit., paragraph 45. 
82 Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
83 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 12. 
84 Case C-217/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union (EU:C:2006:279) paragraph 12. 
85 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 15. 
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In its judgement, the Court made no distinction between the establishment of the ENISA and 
the tasks conferred upon it, but seemed to view them as one single measure.86 It merely 
remarked that the legislator may find it necessary to establish a Community body responsible 
for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation.87 The Court did however 
indicate that a determination was desirable as to whether the Agency and its objectives and 
tasks may be regarded as measures for approximation.88  
 
The Court then performed a two-step test, firstly examining whether the tasks conferred on the 
body were closely linked to the subject matter of the acts harmonising the laws in the MSs.89 
After looking into the Directives concerning network and information security the Court found 
that to be the case.90 It then went on to examine if the establishment of the agency together with 
its objectives and tasks could be considered harmonising measures within the meaning of 
Article 114 TFEU. This was done by examining whether those objectives and tasks may be 
regarded as supporting and providing a framework for the implementation of the legislation 
concerning network and information security.91 It was found that the ENISA Regulation did 
not constitute an isolated measure but was to be considered a part of a normative context 
directed at completing the internal market in the area of electronic communications.92 The Court 
stated that the legislature had been faced with trying to manage an area that did not only develop 
fast but was also very complex. The legislature had foreseen that this would lead to differences 
in MSs transposition of the specific Directives and found that an appropriate way to meet this 
challenge was through the establishment of the ENISA.93  
 
What can be derived from the ENISA-case is first and foremost that the tasks of an agency 
established on the basis of Article 114 TFEU must be closely linked with the legislation 
governing the area which it is to be active within. Secondly the agency and its tasks and 
objectives viewed jointly must be considered harmonising within that same area. Thirdly what 
                                                
86 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 13. 
87 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 44. 
88 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 59. 
89 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 47. 
90 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 58. 
91 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 59. 
92 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 60. 
93 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 61-62. 
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seems to have been decisive in the case is the fact that the agency was temporary and that a 
review of its effectiveness awaited.  
 
Harmonisation was also touched upon in the Short Selling case. The ESMA was created as one 
of the ESAs with the purpose of protecting the public interest by contributing to the short, 
medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system for the Union 
economy, its citizens and businesses.94 For this purpose it was given extensive powers and 
became one of the most powerful EU agencies, as it enjoys regulatory, decision-making, and 
exclusive-supervisory powers.95 
 
In 2012 the UK brought an action for annulment to the CJEU, seeking to annul Article 28 of 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012, on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, 
which allows the ESMA to intervene in exceptional circumstances. 
 
The UK contended Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the delegation of powers to the 
ESMA to take decisions that directly affect natural or legal persons.96 The Article did not allow 
the EU legislature to take individual decisions that were not of general application or to delegate 
to the Commission or a Union agency the power to adopt such decisions.97 Furthermore, such 
decisions overriding the decisions of National Competent Authorities [NCA] could not be seen 
as harmonising in accordance with Article 114 TFEU.98 
 
The Court found that for the questioned provision in the Short Selling Regulation99 to be within 
the scope of Article 114 TFEU it must satisfy two conditions. First, it must comprise a measure 
for the approximation of provisions laid down by law regulation or administrative action in the 
MSs. Second, it must have as its objective the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.100 With regard to the first condition the Court found that the authors of the TFEU had 
                                                
94 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council Article 1 paragraph 5.  
95 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1241. 
96 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union (EU:C:2014:18) paragraph 88. 
97 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 89. 
98 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 90. 
99 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council Article 28. Henceforth “ESMA Regulation”. 
100 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 100. 
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intended to confer upon the legislature a discretion as regards the most appropriate method of 
harmonisation for achieving a desired result, and that this was especially true in areas with 
complex technical features.101 The Court then referred to the ENISA case, where it was found 
that the establishment of an EU body may be necessary in the pursuit of harmonisation.102 The 
MSs’ legislation on short selling was fragmented and some MSs had taken divergent measures. 
Therefore, to end a fragmented situation it was necessary to address the potential risks arising 
from short selling and credit default swaps in a harmonised manner.103 In respect of the second 
condition the Court found that the common framework laid down was intended to prevent the 
creation of obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market.  The purpose of the powers 
provided for in the contended provision was, the Court stated, in fact to improve the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in the financial field.104 Article 114 
TFEU was hence the appropriate legal basis for the delegation of the powers in question.  
 
The two questions posed in the Short Selling case are arguably more open than those in the 
ENISA case. In Short Selling the Court did not undertake the same control of whether the tasks 
were closely linked to the acts regulating the area. It merely stated that the legislature has a 
wide margin of discretion in its choice of what is the most appropriate means of harmonisation 
and found that as long as that measure could be seen as harmonising, and had as its object the 
establishment of the internal market, then it was within the scope of Article 114 TFEU.  
 
4.2. The agency’s place in the institutional framework: the principle of 
conferral, separation of powers and institutional balance 
The creation of an agency must respect its specific place in the institutional framework of the 
EU. This means that no power that was not already conferred on the Union can be conferred on 
an agency, nor can it affect the institutional balance of the EU. 
 
The principle of conferral 
Article 5 TEU establishes that the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle 
of conferral, meaning that the EU can only act within the limits of the competences explicitly 
                                                
101 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 102. 
102 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 104. 
103 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 110-111. 
104 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 114 & 116. 
 27 
or implicitly conferred on it. Competences not conferred on the Union shall remain with the 
MSs.105 A requirement for EU agencies is subsequently that no new power can have originated 
through the creation of the agency that was not originally conferred on the EU. 
 
The separation of powers and institutional balance 
Furthermore agencies based on Article 114 TFEU must not disrupt the separation of powers 
nor affect the institutional balance of the EU. This requirement was firstly addressed in the case 
Meroni. In the case the Court refers to the “balance of powers”.106 The term as it was formulated 
in Meroni is however different from the contemporary institutional balance.107  
 
The term balance of powers was used as a substitute for the principle of separation of powers 
of Montesquieu, in the era of the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC].108 The concept 
was used primarily to safeguard the decision making process in the Union, as well as individuals 
rights.109 In the Meroni case it is used to underline the importance of not giving an agency more 
power than the delegating authority, by not making it subject to the same conditions that apply 
to the delegating authority. It is worth mentioning here that the powers of the EU have not been 
functionally and institutionally separated in the same manner as in a national state. The EU has 
a more functional separation of powers than national states, as there is no single institution 
holding the legislative role.110  
 
Institutional balance is not mentioned in the Treaties, but has been established through the case 
law of the CJEU, although it links to the Article 5 principle of conferred powers.111 The concept 
of institutional balance rests on the notion that the EU legal system is closed, and within it exists 
a sum of powers with different aspects representing wider interests.112 
                                                
105 TEU, op. cit., Article 5. 
106 Case C-9/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(EU:C:1958:7) page 152.  
107 See for instance: Szegedi, 2014, op. cit., 301 and Chamon, 2011, op. cit., 1058. 
108 Szegedi, 2014, op. cit., 301. 
109 Chamon, 2011, op. cit., 1058. 
110 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 149-150. 
111 Lenaerts, Koen & Verhoeven, Amaryllis, "Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance" in Good 
Governance In Europe's Integrated Market. C Joerges & R Dehousse (ed), 1st ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2002: 
44. 
112 Bergström, 2015, op. cit., 220. 
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In the case Chernobyl the Court found that the Treaties set up a system for distributing powers 
among the different Community institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the 
institutional structure of the Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
Community.113 This means, the Court stated, that each institution must exercise its powers with 
due regard for the powers of the other institutions and there must exist a possibility to penalize 
any breach of this rule.114 
 
The principles of separation of powers and institutional balance can be said to operate at 
different levels, the first one being relevant for the evaluation of the legal architecture and 
political functioning of the EU, and the second one being useful to evaluate the political 
functioning of the EU.115 It has hence been proposed by several authors that institutional 
balance is not an obstacle to agencification, but that agencification would in fact strengthen the 
institutional balance.116  
 
An interesting aspect of institutional balance is that it has changed its shape from a static to a 
dynamic rule.117 The rule demands that the EU institutions, positively, assume fully the political 
responsibility conferred on them by the Treaties and, negatively, to refrain from abusing their 
powers. It can hence be argued that there exists both an abstract political institutional balance 
and a legal institutional balance, allowing the term to be interpreted dynamically.118  
 
Seeing as the principle of separation of powers and institutional balance work on different levels 
and can be used to evaluate different aspects, they are both relevant to the investigation of 
agencification.119  
 
                                                
113 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities (EU:C:1990:217) paragraph 21. 
114 Case C-70/88 Chernobyl, op. cit., paragraph 22. 
115 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 154. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Macchia, Marco, “Procedural decision-making and the Banking Union – The accountability mechanisms”. TARN Working 
Paper Series, 4, 2017: 7. 
118 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 158. 
119 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 154.  
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4.3. Nature of the powers conferred: Clearly defined executive powers 
leaving no room for discretion 
The requirement that agency powers must be clearly defined was established first in the Meroni 
case.120 The case was delivered in 1958 by the Court under the ECSC Treaty. In short, it allowed 
only for the delegation of executive powers. Even though the case was decided on under a treaty 
very different from the current version of the TFEU, it is still often cited and has been called an 
“institutional cornerstone” in the agencification of the EU.121  
 
The Court established that there is a great difference in delegation of powers if they consist of:  
“clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict 
review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, or whether it 
involves a discretionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion which may, according 
to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy.”122  
The second alternative would in fact amount to a real transfer of responsibility. Article 3 ECSC 
stated that the common objectives of the Community are binding on not only the High Authority 
but on all the institutions of the Community within the limits of their respective powers. This, 
the Court found, constituted a fundamental guarantee for institutional balance within the 
Community and a delegation of powers to an institution not established in the Treaty would 
render that guarantee ineffective.  
 
The Meroni case is now almost sixty years old but there is no question as to whether the doctrine 
still has merit, it has been referred to by the Court as recently as 2015.123 The case established 
that delegation of powers was indeed possible within the regulatory framework but it was 
dependant on the nature of the powers conferred. Delegation of powers of the first kind was 
allowed while the second kind disrupted the balance of powers guaranteed by the Treaty. 
Accordingly, a certain level of discretion in the decision making of an agency is acceptable, as 
                                                
120 Case C-9/56 Meroni, op. cit. 
121 Szegedi, 2014, op. cit., 299. 
122 Case C-9/56 Meroni, op. cit., page 152. 
123 Case C-147/13 Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union (EU:C:2015:299). 
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long as there are clear conditions circumscribing the exercise of that discretion and a wide 
margin of discretion is not afforded.124 
 
The issue was addressed anew in the case Short selling. In the case the UK argued that 
determining whether the criteria of Article 28(2) of Regulation EU (No) 236/2012 were met 
entailed a “very large measure of discretion” which would amount to a breach of the Meroni 
non-delegation doctrine. The UK claimed that this sort of discretion would lead to a “highly 
subjective judgement”, stating that the fact that MSs had adopted different approaches to short 
selling implied its complex nature and thus the margin of discretion that deciding on the matter 
would entail.125 The UK further claimed that determining whether the NCA has taken 
appropriate measures in addressing a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial 
markets, or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system will require the ESMA 
to take potentially controversial decisions. These decisions would amount to the 
implementation of actual economic policy and an arbitrary weighing of public interests.126 The 
UK also argued that the ESMA has a wide range of choices as to which measure to impose and 
as to any exceptions that may be specified, and that those choices have very significant 
economic and financial policy implications.127 
 
Addressing this plea in law the Court pointed out that the bodies in question in the Meroni case 
were private law enterprises whereas the ESMA was a European Union entity, created by the 
EU legislature.128 It also observed that Article 28 of Regulation EU (No) 236/2012 did not 
confer any autonomous power beyond the bounds of the regulatory framework established by 
the ESMA Regulation.129 Unlike the powers in the Meroni case, the powers of the ESMA were 
circumscribed by various conditions and criteria limiting the discretion of the ESMA, including 
inter alia the consultation requirement and the temporary nature of the measures authorised.130 
The Court found that the ESMA was obliged to investigate a significant number of factors 
                                                
124 Moloney, 2014, op. cit., 1660. 
125 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 28.  
126 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 29. 
127 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 30-31. 
128 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 43. 
129 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 44. 
130 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 50. 
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before taking a decision, and several cumulative criteria needed to be met.131 It followed, the 
Court found, that the powers under Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 did not confer 
on the ESMA a very large measure of discretion but were precisely delineated and open to 
judicial review in the light of the objectives set out by the delegating authority and hence were 
in conformity with the requirements of Meroni.132  
 
4.4. The impact of agency acts: Acts having the force of law vs acts of general 
application 
The following section concerns the impact of acts adopted by agencies. Agency acts cannot 
have the force of law, but they can be of general application.  
 
The requirement that agency acts cannot have the force of law was first laid down in the case 
Romano.133 The case concerned Giuseppe Romano who was entitled to invalidity pension in 
two MSs, Belgium and Italy. Mr Romano was an Italian national living in Belgium where he 
was awarded invalidity pension and later retirement pension.134 This led the Belgian sickness 
and invalidity insurance institution to take the decision that, in accordance with Belgian law, 
Mr Romano’s Belgian pension was to be reduced by the amount of the Italian pension. In 
October 1976 Mr Romano brought an action that did not question the principle of adjusting the 
pension, but the exchange rate that had been used to calculate the size of the reduction. The 
Belgian institution had, inter alia, based their decision on a pension calculation scheme issued 
by the Administrative Commission.135 In 1980 the Belgian court stayed its proceedings and 
referred a question to the CJEU. The question concerned whether the agency’s decision, 
containing the pension calculation scheme, was lawful and if so how it must be interpreted.136  
 
The Court stated that the duties of the Administrative Commission were, inter alia,  
“that of dealing with all administrative questions and questions of interpretation arising from 
the regulation and subsequent regulations, or from any agreement or arrangement concluded 
                                                
131 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 48. 
132 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 52-53. 
133 Case C-98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité (EU:C:1981:104). 
134 Case C-98/80 Romano, op. cit., paragraph 3. 
135 Case C-98/80 Romano, op. cit., paragraph 10. 
136 Case C-98/80 Romano, op. cit., paragraph 14. 
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thereunder, without prejudice to the right of the authorities, institutions and persons 
concerned to have recourse to the procedures and tribunals provided for by the legislation of 
Member States, by the regulation or by the Treaty”.137  
The Court then arrived at the conclusion that an agency such as the Administrative Commission 
cannot be empowered to adopt acts having the force of law and that the Belgian court was 
therefore not bound by the decision.138 The Romano case hence added another criterion to the 
so called non-delegation doctrine, namely that the Council could not delegate to agencies the 
power to adopt acts "having the force of law".  
 
This requirement was also dealt with in the Short-selling case. In that case the UK argued for a 
breach of the Romano non-delegation doctrine, stating that Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 
236/2012 allows the ESMA to adopt measures of a quasi-legislative nature that are of general 
application.139 Therefore it was not a question of individual decisions or a group of individual 
decisions, but “measures of general application having the force of law”.140 With regards to this 
the Court noted the change in the institutional scenery since Romano and referred to Articles 
263 and 277 TFEU.  
 
The Articles acknowledge the existence of agencies and open up for judicial review of agency 
acts, but they do not mention the establishment of agencies. The Court stated that the first 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 277 TFEU, “expressly [sic!] permits Union bodies, 
offices and agencies to adopt acts of general application”.141 The Court did however not find 
that this was in conflict with the principle established in Romano.142 
 
The question of what impact agency acts may have does not have a simple answer. If the 
Romano doctrine, according to the Court itself, is not obsoleted by the Short Selling case then 
we can come to the conclusion that agency acts may indeed be binding and of general 
                                                
137 Case C-98/80 Romano, op. cit., paragraph 12. 
138 Case C-98/80 Romano, op. cit., paragraph 20. 
139 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 56. 
140 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 57. 
141 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 65. 
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application, but may not have the force of law. What, exactly, the difference is and where the 
line is drawn between the two will have to be established in future case law.  
 
4.5. Reviewability and accountability 
Lastly is the requirement that conferred powers must be reviewable, both through continuous 
oversight and accountability. 
 
The importance of being able to review conferred powers was pointed out already in the Meroni 
case. There the Court found that had the powers conferred instead been exercised by the High 
Authority, they would have been subject to review under the Court.143 But when conferred, the 
possibility to judicial review was lost. It was for this reason, in part, that the Court found the 
conferral to be unlawful in that case.  
 
The issue was dealt with again in the Romano case. One of the primary reasons for the Court 
disapproving of the delegation was the fact that the decisions of agencies were not available for 
review under the CJEU. The EEC Treaty established that the power to issue legally binding 
decisions belongs only to the Commission and provided for judicial review of only the 
Commission and Council's decisions.144 Since no agencies had been foreseen in the Treaty as 
possible authors of legally binding decisions and hence not been made subject to judicial 
review, the delegation was unlawful. 
 
In the ENISA case a decisive factor was that the Agency was temporary and that an evaluation 
was scheduled to take place to decide on the fate of the Agency after having studied its 
effectiveness and its contribution to the implementation of the Directives concerning network 
and information security.145  
 
In the Short Selling case the Court found the establishment of, and delegation of powers on, the 
ESMA to be lawful. This depended, as previously stated, in part on the fact that Article 263 and 
267 TFEU acknowledged the existence of agencies and opened up for review of their acts by 
the CJEU.  
                                                
143 Case C-9/56 Meroni, op. cit., page 149. 
144 Scholten & van Rijsbergen, 2014, op. cit., 1239. 
145 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 65-66. 
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It is clear that the possibility to review the acts of an agency as well as its functioning and 
efficiency is a decisive factor in determining the legality of the establishment and the conferral 
of powers on it.  
 
4.6. The legal limits to agencification 
Summing up the legal limits to agencification we find that for an agency to be rightly 
established on Article 114 it must firstly have an objective that is harmonising and better 
achieved on a Union level. The creation of an agency must also be proportionate to the objective 
to be achieved. Secondly, the establishment of an agency cannot implicate the creation of a new 
power for the Union nor alter the balance of powers within the EU. Thirdly, the powers 
conferred on the agency must be clearly defined and leave no room for discretion. Fourth, the 
acts adopted by the agency can be of general application but cannot have the force of law. Fifth, 
there must be ways of reviewing the agency. Both through oversight and through accountability.  
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5. The SRB in relation to the agency requirements 
5.1. Establishment of the SRB and its primary tasks 
Having determined the requirements for an agency to be rightly established on Article 114 
TFEU, we now turn the spotlight on the SRB. The following sections will look closer at the 
two primary tasks of the Agency.  
 
The planning of a bank resolution is made ex ante and is hence what makes up most of the 
SRB’s day-to-day work when banks are not failing. This is to allow the SRB to be prepared and 
have a resolution plan ready in the event that an intervention becomes necessary. When the 
SRB finds that it is time for a resolution, the resolution plan is adopted by the Board in its 
extended session and becomes a resolution scheme. 
 
5.1.1. Drawing up and adopting resolution plans  
The SRB’s primary task is to draft and adopt resolution plans and schemes for credit 
institutions.146 The objective is to allow for banks that are failing to do so in an orderly manner 
without greater disruptions to the stability of the market on a larger scale.147 The resolution 
planning is done in so called Internal Resolution Teams [IRT] consisting of staff from the SRB 
and from the relevant NRAs and are headed by coordinators appointed from the SRB’s senior 
staff.148 In the resolution plan the banks critical functions are determined and any obstacles to 
a possible future resolution are identified and addressed. The resolution plan lays out a 
resolution strategy, including which resolution tools to apply.149  
 
There are four resolution tools. The sale of business tool allows for total or partial disposal of 
the entity’s business. The bridge institution tool entails a transfer of the entity as a whole or in 
part to a temporary entity which is totally or partially publicly owned. The asset separation tool 
involves the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities to an asset management vehicle which is 
                                                
146 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 8 paragraph 1. 
147 Bozina Beros, Marta, “Some reflections on the governance and accountability of the Single Resolution Board”. TARN 
Working Paper Series, 3, 2017: 3. 
148 The Single Resolution Board,  2016, op. cit., 11. 
149 The Single Resolution Board,  2016, op. cit., 11. 
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totally or partially publicly owned. The bail-in tool is used to write down or convert equity and 
debt, placing the burden on creditors and shareholders rather than taxpayers.150  
 
If an entity has subsidiaries or significant branches in non-participating MSs a Resolution 
College is established. A Resolution College brings together the SRB with the NRA or NRAs 
of the relevant non-participating MS/s. For entities without significant branches in non-
participating MSs no Resolution College is needed. The IRT draws up a resolution plan which 
then enters into the formal adoption process.151  
 
After a resolution plan has been drafted it is communicated to the European Central Bank [ECB] 
or the NCA for consultation. It is then submitted the Board in its extended executive session 
for approval after which it is communicated to the relevant bank. If there is a Resolution College 
involved then it must be consulted before the approval of the plan. 
 
5.1.2. Adoption of resolution schemes 
If the SRB in its extended executive session has found that a bank meets the conditions for 
resolution, it will adopt a resolution scheme. For a resolution scheme to be adopted three 
conditions must be met.152 Firstly, the ECB must have found in their assessment that the entity 
is failing or likely to fail. The SRB can itself make such an assessment if the ECB has been 
alerted that it intends to do so and the ECB has not made the assessment within three days of 
receiving that message. Secondly, there can be no reasonable prospect that any alternative 
private sector measures would prevent the failure in respect of the timing and other relevant 
circumstances. This is decided on by the SRB in its executive session. Thirdly, a resolution 
action must be in the public interest.  
 
A resolution is in the public interest if it is necessary to achieve, and is proportionate to, one or 
more of the resolution objectives.153 The resolution objectives include the ensuring of critical 
functions, avoiding significant adverse effects on financial stability, protecting certain 
                                                
150 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 22 paragraph 2 and The Single Resolution Board, 2016, op. cit.,12. 
151 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 8 paragraph 2 and The Single Resolution Board, 2016, op. cit., 15 and 17. 
152 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 18 paragraph 1. 
153 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 18 paragraph 5. 
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depositors154 and investors155 as well as public funds and client funds and assets.156 Once the 
SRB has found that the conditions are met it consults with the NRA and adopts the scheme. 
The ECB shall during this process provide all necessary information to the SRB to help inform 
the assessment process but the SRB is ultimately responsible to determine whether there is no 
alternative action available and a resolution action is necessary.  
 
The scheme shall place the entity under resolution, determine what resolution tools shall be 
utilized and whether the SRF is to be used.157 Immediately after the resolution scheme has been 
adopted it must be sent to the Commission. The Commission then has 24 hours to either endorse 
or object to the resolution scheme with regard to the discretionary aspects of it.158 Within the 
first 12 hours the Commission may object to the scheme before the Council if it considers that 
the condition for public interest is not fulfilled, or suggest a modification of the amount to be 
used from the SRF. If no objection has been expressed by either the Commission or the Council 
after the 24 hour period has expired, the resolution scheme may enter into force.  
 
After this walk-through of the SRB primary tasks we shall now proceed to examine this 
procedure in the light of the requirements established in Chapter 4. 
 
5.2. The proper level of legislation for the SRB 
The first theme to be examined is the proper level for the legislation. For the legislation to be 
rightly established on a Union level and on Article 114 TFEU if must respect the limits of 
subsidiarity, proportionality and have a harmonising objective. 
 
Subsidiarity and proportionality 
The principle of subsidiarity gives that the EU shall only act in areas which are not covered by 
its exclusive competence if the objectives of the measure proposed cannot be sufficiently 
achieved on a MS level, by the simultaneous enactment of identical legislation.159 The 
establishment of an agency with the power to draw up and adopt resolution schemes could 
                                                
154 Depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU.  
155 Investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC. 
156 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 14 paragraph 2. 
157 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 18 paragraph 6.  
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arguably not have been achieved in said manner. Although as mentioned previously, the Court, 
when confronted with this issue, has mainly looked at whether or not the legislature has given 
thought to the aspect of subsidiarity.  
 
The SRM Regulation states that ensuring an effective resolution procedure on a Union level is 
essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services and that as long as 
resolution rules and practices remain at national level, the internal market will continue to be 
fragmented.160 The Regulation hence addresses that the area is disintegrated and in need of 
harmonisation. This may seem to be a vague motivation for showing that the principle for 
subsidiarity is fulfilled. Nonetheless, in accordance with previous case law, as long as it has 
been shown that there exists obstacles to the establishment of the internal market then this 
should be satisfactory for the legislature to have proven that a Union level measure is necessary.  
 
Having found that the measure is better achieved on a Union level we move to the requirement 
for proportionality. As was demonstrated in section 4.1., the threshold for considering a 
measure disproportionate is very high. Similar to the situation in the case Ex p. BAT the SRB 
is active in an area that demands political, economic and social choices on its part, building on 
complex assessments. For the establishment of the SRB to be illegal on the grounds of it being 
disproportionate, it must thus be “manifestly inappropriate” in relation to the objective pursued. 
Seeing as it is established that agencies can in fact be an acceptable response to obstacles in the 
internal market161, it is highly unlikely that the SRB would be deemed illegal on the basis of 
not being proportionate. 
 
Harmonising objective 
Furthermore cases ENISA and Short Selling have shown that an agency can indeed be within 
the scope of the legislature’s margin of discretion, as long as the establishment and the powers 
of the agency have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
can be seen as harmonising.  
 
In the Short Selling case the Court stated two conditions to be satisfied: First, the measure must 
comprise a measure for the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
                                                
160 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 9 and 12. 
161 See section 3.2. 
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administrative action in the MSs. Second, it must have as its objective the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.162 
 
The Court found in that case that the authors of the Treaties intended to grant the legislature 
with a wide margin of discretion as to what is the most appropriate method for harmonisation 
where the area is characterized by complex and technical features. The power contended in the 
Short Selling case was the ESMA’s power to intervene directly in exceptional circumstances. 
This is similar to the situation with the SRB, which will also intervene directly, but on a larger 
scale.  
 
The preamble of the SRM Regulation discusses the subject of harmonisation, and how a 
centralised resolution procedure will promote the functioning of the internal market, at length. 
It is stated inter alia that the financial crisis has shown that the functioning of the internal market 
is under threat.163 There is an increasing risk of financial fragmentation, and as long as the 
resolution rules and practices stay national, the internal market will remain fragmented.164 
Furthermore, divergences between the national resolution rules and the lack of a unified 
decision making process for resolution in the Union contributes to instability and lack of 
confidence in the market as they do not ensure predictability as to the possible outcome of a 
bank failure.165 Divergences in national rules may also lead banks and customers to have higher 
borrowing costs, simply because of their place of establishment.166  
 
The preamble remarks that the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, establishing a 
common framework for the MSs resolution procedures, admittedly is a step along the way, but 
that it still leaves discretion to the national authorities in the application of the tools and in the 
use of national financing arrangements.  
 
The preamble goes on to state that the SRM is not to be judged on its own, but is an interwoven 
part of a system harmonising the prudential supervision of the internal market, together with 
                                                
162 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 100. 
163 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 1. 
164 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 1 and 9. 
165 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 2. 
166 SRM Regulation, op. cit., recital 4. 
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inter alia the establishment of the EBA, the SSM and the directives and regulations covering 
the area.167  
 
Moreover, common and effective resolution rules is in the interest of the MSs from a banking 
perspective, but also in general, as it will promote a level competitive playing field and improve 
the functioning of the internal market.168 Considering the interconnectedness of the financial 
market, the MSs participating in the SSM would have a stronger negative systemic impact on 
the non-participating MSs in the absence of the SRM. The SRM, the preamble states, will limit 
the spill-over effects of failing banks in the non-participating MSs and thus promote the 
functioning of the internal market as a whole.169 
 
The SRM Regulation hence more than justifies that the SRB has been established in the name 
of harmonisation.  
 
It would seem that the establishment of the SRB likely satisfies the requirements of subsidiarity, 
proportionality and of having a harmonising objective. At least in reference to how the 
requirements have hitherto been handled by the Court. Accordingly, we shall now examine how 
it is tailored to fit into the institutional framework of the EU.  
 
5.3. The SRB’s place in the institutional framework 
The second theme to be observed is that of the SRBs place in the structure of the EU. For the 
SRB to be acceptable in the EU institutional organisation it must respect the limits of conferred 
powers, separation of powers and institutional balance.  
 
The principle of conferred powers 
As stated previously, principle of conferred powers states that the EU can only act within the 
limits of the powers that the MSs have conferred upon them. No new power can have been 
generated for the Union with the creation of the agency. However, the powers laid down in EU 
Treaty legislation is often vaguely and broadly worded, being the result of multilateral 
negotiations, giving room for ample interpretation.  
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Chamon states that the question of whether the power vested in an agency is originally 
conferred on the EU, is typically not very contentious. Agency powers are usually dependent 
on an earlier exercise of competence by the EU, that is, the EU legislator adopting new 
legislation which is then implemented.170 This is the case also regarding resolution. The 
common resolution framework for the Union as a whole, is laid down in the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive. Since the framework takes the form of a Directive it allows for the 
MSs to implement it into their own legal systems in the way that best suits that state. But for 
the Eurozone, it is the SRB that applies the Directive. Seeing as the powers were already 
established in a Directive, it is not very precarious to conclude that the conferral of tasks to the 
SRB is within the principle of conferred powers.  
 
Balance/separation of powers 
In the Meroni case we could see that the objective of the principle of balance/separation of 
powers was to safeguard the decision making process of the Union and individuals rights.  
 
As regards individuals rights the SRB can, when applying the bail-in resolution tool, write down 
or convert depositor funds not covered by the deposit guarantee in Directive 2014/49/EU.171 
This may amount to a breach of the right to property established in Article 17(1) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, in the 
recent case Ledra Advertising, which concerned the bail-in of uninsured deposits, the Court 
opened up for the possibility that restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of the right to 
property.172 This is, nevertheless, dependent on that the restrictions genuinely meet the 
objectives of public interest, are proportionate and do not impair the very substance of the right 
guaranteed.173 
 
Firstly, the adoption of a resolution scheme is reliant on the fact that a resolution is in the public 
interest. This is also a ground for the Commission to object to the scheme. If the SRB has found 
                                                
170 Chamon, 2016, op. cit., 4. 
171 SRM Regulation, op. cit., Article 27. 
172 Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB (EU:C:2016:701) paragraph 70. 
173 Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra, op. cit., paragraph 70. 
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that a resolution applying the bail-in tool is in the public interest and the Commission has not 
objected to this, then one can presume that it would be accepted as in being in the public interest 
by the Court as well.  
 
Secondly, the SRM Regulation states that “interference with property rights should not be 
disproportionate”. Consequently, shareholders and creditors shall, through a resolution, not 
suffer greater losses than they would have done should the entity have been wound up under at 
the time that the resolution decision is taken.174 As the Court has tended to, in respect to 
proportionality, only examine whether the principle has been taken into consideration, this 
should satisfy the requirement for the measure to be proportionate. It should also guarantee that 
the very substance of the right is not impaired seeing as the shareholders and creditors will not 
be worse off than had the bank been wound up. However, the Court did not address the question 
of who can impose restrictions to the right to property, it is hence uncertain whether the Court 
would accept that it be made by an EU Agency.  
 
Institutional balance 
Concerning whether the SRB disrupts the institutional balance of the EU, Lenaerts and 
Verhoeven state that three principles can be derived from the case law of the CJEU for the 
evaluation of institutional balance: 
 
1. Each institution shall enjoy a sufficient independence in order to exercise its powers.  
2. Institutions should not unconditionally assign their powers to other institutions.  
3. Institutions may not, in the exercise of their powers, encroach on the powers and 
prerogatives of other institutions.175  
 
The SRB has been provided with some quite extensive powers. Its place in the institutional 
framework allows it to exercise those powers to a certain extent. As an expert body the SRB is 
given a considerable amount of trust in its assessments and conclusions. But in the end it must 
always look for endorsement from, or at least give chance for objection to, the Commission and 
the Council.176 This proves that the SRB is indeed independent in its use of powers, but at the 
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176 See further section 5.6.  
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same time, that the legislature has not assigned it those powers unconditionally. The 
Commission acknowledged the need for an expert body, faced with an area of extreme 
complexity, but on the other hand, retained the power itself to have the final say when adopting 
resolution schemes.177 As stated previously, this can be seen as a strengthening of the 
institutional balance, as opposed to a disruption. Allowing experts to make assessments and 
propose actions, but leaving the final decisive powers with the Commission and the Council. 
 
Summing up, it can be expected that the powers of the SRB will be seen as being within the 
principle of conferral and that institutional balance would likely not compose an issue to the its 
establishment. There is however a risk that the Court would oppose the restricting of the right 
to property invoked by an agency. 
 
5.4. Nature of the powers conferred on the SRB 
This leads us to the third theme of the study, namely, examining the nature of the powers 
conferred on the SRB. Whether they are clearly defined and executive, or if they leave room 
for discretion. 
 
The requirement that conferred powers must be executive and clearly defined was, as we have 
seen, first dealt with in Meroni and last in the Short Selling case. The Short Selling case 
confirmed the principle established in Meroni, that powers must be executive and not entail 
discretion.178 But it gave it a new shape, laying down a new delegation doctrine for the EU.179 
 
In Short Selling the Court found, first of all, that the ESMA’s action under the contended Article 
could only be exercised under certain specific circumstances. Those are, to address a threat to 
the orderly functioning and integrity of the internal market or to the stability of the whole or 
part of the financial system of the Union, and there are cross border implications. This is also 
limited to situations where the MS has failed to act or the actions have failed to address the 
threat adequately.180  
 
                                                
177 Zavvos & Kaltsouni, 2015, op. cit., 20. 
178 Bergström, 2015, op. cit., 240. 
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180 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 46. 
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The adoption of a resolution scheme is surrounded by numerous conditions to be met. First of 
all the ECB (or in certain cases the SRB itself) must have found that a bank is failing or likely 
to fail. Secondly, there can be no prospect that any other private sector measure could prevent 
the failure and thirdly it must be in the public interest.  
 
As we have seen, a resolution is in the public interest if it is necessary to achieve one or more 
of the resolution objectives.181 The resolution objectives include ensuring the continuity of 
critical functions, avoiding significant adverse effects on financial stability and protecting inter 
alia public and depositor funds. These objectives all describe a hazard to the financial market 
of some sort, implying that the SRB does indeed respond to a threat to the stability of, at least 
part of, the financial system in the EU when adopting a resolution scheme.  
 
The Court also found in Short Selling that the ESMA, when adopting measures, is bound to 
consider the extent to which the measure addresses the threat.182 
 
When applying resolution tools the SRB must take a number of things into consideration. It is 
however not obliged to assess the level to which the measure addresses the threat. This is 
supposedly because the threat to the financial stability to be handled is the failing bank. When 
placing a bank under resolution the threat of it failing is effectively eliminated. Thus not giving 
much reason for the SRB to consider the level to which the threat is addressed.  
 
The Court further found in the Short Selling case that the ESMA’s margin of discretion was 
circumscribed both by the consultation requirement and the temporary nature of the measures. 
The ESMA is required to consult both with the European Systemic Risk Board and, if 
necessary, other relevant bodies. It must also notify the competent national authorities 
concerned of the measure it proposes to take. Moreover, the ESMA must review the measure 
at least every three months.183 
 
When resolution plans are drawn up the relevant NRA is not only consulted, but is a part of the 
process of drafting the plan. The Commission and the ECB are also present as observers. It is 
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183 Case C-270/12 Short Selling, op. cit., paragraph 50. 
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further communicated to the ECB for consultation before being approved in the extended 
executive session of the Board. The measures adopted by the SRB are, however, in no way 
temporary. On the contrary, they are final. When a bank is placed under resolution there is no 
possibility of restoring it to its former shape. This might be seen as problematic for the SRB. 
However, there are two aspects to be considered. First of all, before the ESMA could take a 
decision under the contended Article it did indeed have to consult the European Systemic Risk 
Board. But it did not, as the SRB must, have to await endorsement or objection from the 
Commission and the Council. This makes the democratic legitimacy stronger for the SRB 
measures than it was for the ESMA decisions. Secondly, when the SRB has adopted a resolution 
plan (that is, before the bank is failing or likely to fail), that plan is communicated to the relevant 
bank. This means that the bank has a possibility to challenge the decisions made in the plan 
long before it is adopted as a resolution scheme. This is however not the case for creditors and 
depositors.  
 
It is interesting to note that the SRM Regulation states that the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive leaves discretion to the national authorities in the application of the resolution tools 
and in the use of national financing arrangements, but still does not consider the SRB to have 
been given a wide margin of discretion.184 However, this can be explained by the fact that the 
Directive only provides minimum harmonisation, and thus in fact leaves a considerable amount 
of discretion to the MSs.185 The SRM Regulation does indeed circumscribe much more detailed 
how the tools are to be applied and how the SRF is to be handled. 
 
In conclusion, it would seem that the legislature has gone to great lengths to make the powers 
of the SRB Meroni-tailored186, by circumscribing them with various conditions specifying 
under what circumstances and in what manner they are to be used.  
 
5.5. The impact of acts adopted by the SRB 
Next we shall examine the requirement regarding the impact of agency acts. The Romano case 
gave that acts adopted by an agency cannot have the force of law. However, the Short Selling 
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case established that acts of general application are within the scope of acceptable agency 
power.  
 
Resolution schemes can have a substantial effect on not only the financial stability in a MS and 
on the Union as such, but also on the fiscal sovereignty of a MS.187 Through resolution schemes 
the SRB can decide on institutional changes, sale of assets and liabilities, write-downs of assets 
and liabilities of legal as well as natural persons. It is thus clear that the impact of an adoption 
of a resolution scheme can be monumental. Nevertheless, a resolution scheme only affects one 
single entity and will not set a precedent for any future resolutions. It is therefore difficult to 
argue for the view that resolution schemes can be seen as having the force of law, nor even be 
of general application.  
 
However, in Short Selling the Court did not primarily give weight to the consequences of an 
act. What was decisive rather seemed to be that the instances in which the ESMA was required 
to adopt decisions of general application, the acts were circumscribed by several criteria that 
the ESMA had to take into account.188 This seems to lead us back to the question of whether 
the decision making of the agency includes discretion. As we have seen in the previous section 
the SRB, like the ESMA, has a number of conditions to consider before adopting a resolution 
scheme. As such it can be stated to, similarly to the ESMA, “be required, in strictly 
circumscribed circumstances, to adopt measures of general application”.189 
 
In conclusion it would seem that even though SRB resolution schemes may have a grand impact 
on the several actors, there is room to argue that they fit within the limits of Romano and Short 
Selling. However, since the principle established from the cases is indeed very vague, it is likely 
that the Court will elaborate on it in future case law. 
 
5.6. Reviewability and accountability of the SRB 
The CJEU case law has shown that for an agency to be rightly established on Article 114 TFEU 
there must be adequate ways to review its functioning and efficiency and hold it accountable.  
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Reviewability 
In the ENISA case a decisive factor in the legality of the establishment of the agency was the 
fact that it had a process for evaluation ready for the Commission.190 This evaluation tool exists 
also in relation to the ESMA but was never addressed by the Court in Short Selling.191 In that 
case the Court merely referred to the possibility of judicial review that is available under 
Articles 263 and 267 TFEU.192 
 
The Commission has multiple ways in which it reviews the work of the SRB. Even though the 
Court did not touch upon the subject of a Commission review in the Short Selling case, the 
SRM Regulation sets out a comprehensive procedure for review to take place every three years, 
starting 2018. The Commission will publish a report evaluating a large number of factors. Inter 
alia the functioning of the SRM, its cost efficiency and the impact of its resolution activities on 
the interests of the Union as a whole. It shall also cover the possible impact on the structures of 
national banking systems within the Union in comparison to other banking systems. 
Furthermore it shall evaluate the effectiveness of the cooperation within the SRM and the 
Banking Union and between the SRM and the NRAs of both participating and non-participating 
MSs as well as the appropriateness of the cooperation between the BU, the European 
Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board. It shall also assess if there is 
in fact a need for an independent agency to exercise the powers conferred through the 
Regulation and, if so, whether any changes to the Regulation need to be made or to Treaty level 
legislation. It shall further assess whether the link between sovereign debt and banking risk has 
been broken and the effectiveness of the independence and accountability arrangements.193  
 
Apart from the three year evaluation, the Commission also oversees the continuous work of the 
SRB in a number of ways. Most importantly the Commission and the ECB have permanent 
observers taking part in all Board sessions, regardless of in which constellation it convenes. 
This allows the Commission to have insight and stay informed of the day-to-day work of the 
SRB, and be prepared for any resolution decision that may be approaching. To completely 
ensure that the Commission is in the loop, the SRM Regulation also lays down an obligation 
                                                
190 Case C-217/04 ENISA, op. cit., paragraph 66. 
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for the Board to inform the Commission of any action it takes to prepare for resolution.194 This 
is followed by an obligation of close cooperation between the Board, the Council and the 
Commission, in particular in relation to resolution planning and resolution action.195  
 
Another form of review is the 24 hour period in which the Commission and the Council can 
endorse, object to or change a resolution scheme. This short timeframe for the adoption of a 
resolution scheme is motivated by the need to minimise disruption of the financial market and 
of the economy.196 It can be questioned whether this period of time is sufficient for the 
Commission to actually be able to make an informed decision on the matter. However, one 
must take into consideration the fact that the Commission has a permanent observer present at 
all Board sessions and that the Board is obliged to communicate to the Commission any action 
in preparation for resolution. As such, neither the fact that a resolution scheme has been 
adopted, nor the setup of it, should come as a surprise to the Commission, this allowing it to 
take a well-informed decision. 
 
Accountability 
There are two ways to hold the SRB accountable. The first being the way of judicial review. 
Article 263 TFEU states that the CJEU shall review the legality of, inter alia, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce a legal effect vis-à-vis third parties.197 As an agency 
the SRB is covered by this judicial review, meaning that any act it adopts that has a legal effect 
towards natural or legal person can be challenged before the Court if the act is addressed to 
them or if it is of direct concern to them.  
 
Before the matter is litigated before the Court the contested issue is reviewed by the SRB’s 
Appeal Panel.198 The Appeal Panel consists of five individuals of high repute, with a proven 
record of expertise and relevant experience, that are not currently members of the Board.199  
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The second way of holding the SRB accountable is through political accountability, holding the 
Board responsible to the EU executive branch, the Commission and the Council, as well as the 
legislative branch, the European Parliament.200 This requires the SRB to submit an annual report 
on the performance of the tasks conferred on it by the SRM Regulation.201 The European 
Parliament also has the option to request a hearing with the Chair of the Board on an ad-hoc 
basis and ask questions to which the Board shall reply orally or in writing.202 There also exista 
a possibility for the European Parliament to conduct confidential oral discussions behind closed 
doors with the Chair of the Board.203 The Chair may also be heard by the Council, at any time, 
on the performance of the resolution tasks by the Board.204 
 
As can be seen the SRM Regulation gives opportunity to have insight into the work of the SRB 
before it takes a decision, to endorse or object to the decision once it has been taken, to hold it 
accountable for any wrongdoing afterwards and to review its function as such in the three year 
review. It is hence clear that the legislature has put great effort into ensuring there are 
comprehensive ways of holding the SRB accountable, following the case law from both ENISA 
and Short Selling. 
 
5.7. Summary  
As can be gathered from the previous sections in the chapter, the legislature has gone to great 
lengths to ensure that the governance and accountability structures of the SRB are in line with 
the case law governing the area of agencification. Even though there remains some issues that 
need to be clarified in future case law, most uncertainties have been considered in one way or 
another when drafting the SRM Regulation. The establishment of the SRB and its primary tasks 
can be argued to fulfil all requirements listed in this study, even if there is also grounds for 
critique in nearly every area.  
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine if the Article 114 TFEU conferral of powers on the 
SRB is legal by looking at its establishment and two of its core powers; the drawing up and 
adoption of resolution plans and the adoption of resolution schemes. 
 
What seems clear is that the establishment of an agency on the basis of Article 114 TFEU is 
now quite straightforward. The Court took a clear stand in the Short Selling case, confirming 
that the establishment of an agency is within the scope of “measures for approximation” as 
stated in the Article. In this case, the establishment of the SRB can be seen as a complement to 
an existing, inadequate, harmonisation measure; the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, 
as it only provides for minimum harmonisation.205 
 
Even though the powers conferred on the SRB are unprecedented in their extensiveness, they 
have been crafted to fit within the legal limits to agencification. By building a governance web 
that allows for almost every part of the process to include the affected parties, to be reviewed 
in multiple ways and to hold the agency accountable, the legislature has managed to tightly fit 
the SRB into the legal limits of agencification. 
 
Some aspects can of course, as we have seen, be criticised. But most of these obstacles to 
legitimacy have been taken into consideration when drafting the SRM Regulation. E.g. the short 
time frame in which the Commission and the Council has to evaluate a resolution scheme can 
be argued to be weighed up by the fact that the Commission has a permanent observer allowed 
at all Board sessions, regardless of the constellation in which the Board convenes. This allows 
the decisions to be more democratically legitimate.  
 
Another possible issue for the establishment of the SRB on Article 114 TFEU is the final nature 
of its adopted measures. When a resolution scheme has been implemented, it is very difficult 
to undo the measures implemented. This may be problematic in relation to the accountability 
aspects as it would mean that even if one can hold the SRB accountable for an incorrect 
decision, the error cannot be rectified.  
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Despite these grounds for critique, it appears that even extensive powers can be made to fit 
within the limits of conferral as long as the framework respects the limits to EU governance 
and accountability. As others have noted, this seems to open up for an almost unlimited 
extension of EU agency powers, as long as they serve the purpose of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.206 It has even been claimed that to the extent that the 
Commission, Council and Parliament find a certain measure necessary to limit obstacles to 
trade or distortions of competition, the Court will adopt a deferential position.207 
 
The introduction chapter of this thesis brought up the question of where the executive backstop 
for Article 114 TFEU goes. The answer to that question is, quite frankly, where the Court 
decides to draw the line. The EU legislature creates agencies, and the Court develops the rules 
of agencification accordingly, allowing the legislature to create even more powerful agencies, 
and so, the circle is complete. The fact that the institutions of the EU confirm each other may 
be problematic in the age of Brexit (and other possible MS exits) when the importance of 
democratic legitimacy is monumental. For this reason it needs to be established, either by the 
Court or by the legislature, clear limits to agencification, as continued uncertainty and 
unpredictable development of agencification may risk that the EU undermines its democratic 
legitimacy. 
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